--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 579525 (Fort Peck C.A.)
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Fort Peck Court of Appeals.

THE FORT PECK TRIBES, Appellant,
v.
HAROLD RALPH HAMILTON, Appellee.

CAUSE NO. AP # 901
|
February 17, 2026

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL AS BARRED BY INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

Appeal from the Fort Peck Tribal Court, Judge Lonnie Headdress, Presiding.

Appellant Fort Peck Tribes, appearing through Tribal Prosecutor Weinberger.

Appellee Harold Hamilton, appearing through Public Defender Terry Boyd.

Before E. Shanley, Chief Justice; R.J. Jones, Associate Justice.; and J. Grijalva, Associate Justice.

BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the Fort Peck Court of Appeals (FPCOA) on an appeal filed by the Fort Peck Tribes (Tribes) on October 7, 2025, from the Tribal Court’s September 24, 2025 Order directing a verdict of acquittal in a jury trial after the Tribes presented its case in chief. Judge Headdress dismissed the complaint and directed an acquittal on the ground that the Tribes provided insufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Appellant is “Indian” as required by federal and tribal law.

JURISDICTION

¶ 1 Neither party questions whether the FPCOA has jurisdiction over a directed verdict acquitting a Defendant for insufficient factual evidence of guilt and the Court also notes that Judge Headress’s order of September 24, 2025 seems to imply that the Tribes could appeal his dismissal The Court also notes that the Fort Peck CCOJ seems to imply that the Tribes can appeal from an acquittal by a Judge, but not by a jury. See 2 CCOJ 205(a). As this Court holds herein, however, it violates double jeopardy for a criminal Defendant to be subjected to a new trial after a Juge issues a directed verdict of acquittal, based upon a finding of an insufficient factual basis to support a conviction. This Court holds that the ruling in Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013) to that effect is consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act prohibition against double jeopardy and bars this appeal since the Court cannot grant the relief requested without running afoul of the Indian Civil Rights Act.

¶ 2 The Fort Peck Code of Justice provides defendants convicted of a crime in Tribal Court with an appeal as a matter of right. See 2 CCOJ 205(a). This absolute right to appeal selves one of the Tribal government’s highest priorities—protecting the liberty and property rights of the Tribes’ individual citizens. See Fort Peck Tribes v. Scheaffer, AP # 892, ¶ 2 (2025), 2025 WL 24434831 (Fort Peck C.A. 2025).

¶ 3 On the other hand, the Code treats the governmental prosecutor—the Fort Peck Tribes (Tribes)—differently. The Tribes have no guaranteed right to appeal criminal cases. In fact, the Code forbids the government from appealing a verdict of not guilty rendered by a jury of the defendant’s peers. 2 CCOJ 205(a). However, the Code specifically allows Tribal appeals of not guilty verdicts issued by a Tribal judge in bench trials. 2 CCOJ 205(a).1 This is a dismissal of a criminal complaint tried to a jury by the presiding Judge based upon that Judge’s assessment that the Tribes had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the Appellee’s status as an Indian to warrant the case going to the jury. This distinguishes this case from other cases decided by the Court where a dismissal is based upon a procedural error that does not go to the weight of the evidence presented. See Scheaffer, Fort Feck Tribes v. Charette, Cause # 046, 1988 WL 1743251 (Port Peck C.A. 1988) (trial of a Defendant after dismissal for failure to arraign not a violation of double jeopardy.)

¶ 4 This Court has consistently held that the issue of whether a criminal Defendant being tried in the lower court is an “Indian” is a factual issue that must be resolved by the ultimate trier of fact. See App # 804, 864, 862 and #868, 868b. So, this Court reversed the lower court’s pre-trial dismissal of a criminal complaint in Jackson v. Tribes for failure of the Tribes to demonstrate probable cause to believe Jackson was Indian. Similarly, in Taypayosaytum this Court denied a habeas corpus application from a criminal Defendant who pled guilty to a criminal charge and then alleged that he was an “indigenous Canadian person’ and thus not an Indian under tribal and federal law. Lastly this Court rejected an appeal by a criminal defendant who failed to raise the issue at trial. This case is different, however, as the Defendant raised this issue after the Tribes presented its case in the form of a Rule 29 motion to dismiss for failure to show sufficient evidence of the commission of the crime.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5 The Tribes ask us to find error in the trial Judge’s decision to find that the Tribes presented insufficient evidence in its case in chief to show that the Appellee herein is Indian because the jury should have been given the chance to make this ultimate decision of fact. They argue that this Court’s precedents support a finding of error because this Court has held that the issue of Indian status should be left to be determined by the ultimate finder of fact and in the case below that should have been the jury.

¶ 6 The Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice Rufe 29 permits a presiding Judge in a jury or Judge trial to grant an acquittal after the Tribes present their case if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. If the motion is granted based upon a procedural error such as a speedy trial violation, discovery violation or other process issue the acquittal does not bar a subsequent prosecution, However, as the United States Supreme Court held in Evans v. Michigan, even if the trial Judge gets the analysis incorrect when granting a directed verdict of acquittal, that acquittal may not he appealed without running afoul of the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution. There the Court held:

Most relevant here, an acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 98. 98 S. Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65; Burks v. United States, 437U. S. 1, 10, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1. In contrast to procedural rulings, which lead to dismissals or mistrials on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, acquittals are substantive rulings that conclude proceedings absolutely, and thus raise significant double jeopardy concerns. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65. Here, the trial court clearly ‘evaluated the [State’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 572, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642. Evans’ acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation of governing legal principles, but that error affects only the accuracy of the determination to acquit, not its essential character.

The Fort Peck Code provides that |n]o person shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.” 6 CCOJ 501. Similarly, ICRA provides that tribes exercising powers of self -government shall not “subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy,” 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(3), which is clearly modeled upon the federal constitutional provision that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. We find that the decision in Evans should be adopted as the double jeopardy standard for this Court also and that ii would constitute double jeopardy for this Court to grant the appeal in this case and permit the Tribes to retry the Appellee.

Therefore, we DENY the appeal in this case on the ground that granting the relief requested would violate the Appellee’s rights not to subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy,

SO ORDERED this 17th day of February 2026.

FORT PECK COURT OF APPEALS

Erin Shanley, Chief Justice

B.J. Jones, Associate Justice

James Grijalva, Associate Justice

All Citations
--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 579525

Footnotes
1	Although this Court has upheld the right of the Tribes to appeal a verdict of not guilty issued by a Judge instead of a jury, it appears to this Court that we should revisit Fort Peck Tribes v. Stormey, Cause # 075, July 25, 1989, as the decision in that case seems to run afoul of contemporary double jeopardy jurisprudence.