--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 579522 (Fort Peck C.A.)
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Fort Peck Court of Appeals.
Fort Peck Tribes, Appellant,
v.
Douglas Grandchamp, Jr., Appellee.
CAUSE NO. AP # 898
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MARCH 02, 2026
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February 28, 2026
Appeal from the Fort Pock Tribal Court, Lonnie Headdress, Presiding Judge.
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
BACKGROUND
¶ 1 This matter comes before the Fort Peck Court of Appeals (FPCOA) on an appeal filed by the Fort Peck Tribes from the Tribal Court’s Order Granting Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss issued on August 25, 2025. The Tribal Court dismissed the charges of Unlawful Possession of Dangerous Drugs, in violation of 7 CCOJ 413-A, Possession of Firearm in Drug Related Crimes, in violation of 7 CCOJ 415-B, Illegal to Sell, Trade, or Bargain in Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of 7 CCOJ 417, Driving in Violation of a Court Order, in violation of 17 CCOJ 121, Driving without a License, in violation of 17 CCOJ 101, and Mandatory Financial Responsibility, in violation of 17 CCOJ 132, based on the Tribal Court’s conclusion that the officer lacked probable cause to search the Appellee’s vehicle.
¶ 2 The Fort Peck Tribes appealed the Order of Dismissal on September 9, 2025. Appellant filed a supplemental brief on December 1, 2025 and Appellee filed a response brief on December 5, 2025. After considering the arguments made by the parties and the lower court record, the Fort Peck Court of Appeals provides the following Order.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
¶ 3 The Fort Peck Appellate Court may review final orders from the Fort Peck Tribal Court 2 CCOJ § 202. The Tribal Court’s Order granting the Motion to Suppress and Dismiss is a final order for purposes of review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 4 This Court reviews de novo all determinations of the lower court on matters of law but shall not set aside any factual determinations of the Tribal Court if such determinations are supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUES
¶ 5 The Parties have presented the following issues on appeal:
- Was the traffic stop a violation of Appellee’s constitutional right against unlawful seizures because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion?
- Was the Appellee’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure violated by the warrantless search of his vehicle?
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE APPELLEE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEIZURE.
¶ 6 The Indian Civil Rights Act provides that “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures....” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2). Stopping an automobile is a seizure for ICRA purposes. Generally, police may not stop a car unless they have at least reasonable suspicion to believe that a law has been violated. Reasonable suspicion must be supported by articulable facts of criminal activity and requires something more than a vague suspicion. Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Whether the standard is met is judged under the totality of the circumstances. U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
¶ 7 If an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been violated, the officer may stop the suspect’s automobile, even if the officer’s ulterior motive is to investigate a crime for which the officer lacks sufficient cause to make a stop. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Probable cause is a reasonable basis for believing a crime may have been committed. To justify a search, an officer must have probable cause which is supported by a reasonable belief that evidence of the crime is believed to be present in the place to be searched. Probable cause significantly expands an officer’s authority.
¶ 8 In the matter at hand, Highway Trooper Joseph Oliver was working within Roosevelt County. He observed a vehicle parked for an unusual amount of time at the Town Pump gas island in Wolf Point. He indicated in his report that this location has been known by law enforcement to be an area of high drug trafficking. He ran the plates in his Mobile Computer Terminal and discovered the plates were registered to a red Chevrolet pickup, however the pickup the plates were attached to was a white pickup. Officer Oliver conducted a traffic stop on that basis as the pickup left the gas station. Pursuant to Tribal law, all vehicles operated within the Fort Peck Reservation shall be licensed and registered in accordance with applicable laws of the State of Montana. 17 CCOJ 132-A. Therefore, Officer Oliver had probable cause to stop Appellee’s vehicle.
II. THE WARRAN1 LESS SEARCH OF APPELLEE’S AUTOMOBILE DID NOT VIOLATE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
¶ 9 The Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice provides that “No law enforcement officer shall conduct any search without a valid warrant except... when the search is of a moving vehicle and the officer has probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, stolon property, or property otherwise unlawfully possessed. 6 CCOJ 303.3.
¶ 10 Generally, it is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable seizures for an officer to prolong a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 (2015). However, as long as the police do not extend the valid stop beyond the time necessary to issue a ticket and conduct ordinary inquiries incident to such stop, it does not violate an individual’s constitutional right against unlawful search arid seizure to allow a narcotics detection dog to sniff the car. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). An alert by a K 9 unit, in addition to other facts, should be considered under a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether there is probable cause to search a vehicle. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).
¶ 11 After initiating the stop, Officer Oliver requested that the Appellee provide his license, registration, and insurance to which Appellee responded he did not have any of those things. Driving without a license is also in violation of Tribal law. 17 CCOJ 101. A second or subsequent offense of Driving without a License is an arrestable offense. Officer Oliver requested that Appellee come back to his patrol unit, to which he consented. While in the patrol unit, Officer Oliver ran the Appellee’s name and date of birth into his Mobile Computer Terminal. The check revealed that he was on the Tribe’s No Driver’s List since 2021, and Officer Oliver indicated Appellee knew or should have known this given his prior stops while driving without a license. Driving in Violation of a Court Order is a Class A misdemeanor in violation of Tribal law. 17 CCOJ 121. Therefore, the Officer had the ability to arrest Appellee for this violation.
¶ 12 Officer Oliver had probable cause to issue citations to the Appellee for the various traffic violations and possibly even arrest Appellee for a second or subsequent offense of Driving Without a License in violation of Title 17, Section 101. However, while questioning Appellee, he provided various inconsistent stories to Officer Oliver curing their conversation and appeared progressively nervous. Because of Appellee’s demeanor, Officer Oliver requested him to consent to a search of his vehicle. Appellee did not consent to a search of his vehicle, but based upon observations of Appellee’s nervousness and the information Officer Oliver received from colleagues involved with narcotics investigations that the Appellee was a person of interest in the distribution of narcotics, Officer Oliver requested that a K-9 unit be deployed, which alerted to presence of narcotics at the driver’s door. The dog alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle. Therefore, the only remaining question for this Court is whether the delay between the issuance of citations and the K-9’s deployment resulted in an unreasonable seizure of the Appellee. We hold that it did not, because based on a totality of the circumstances, the Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle prior to the deployment of the K-9 unit, and also could have searched the vehicle as part of an inventory search because neither the Defendant, nor his passenger, could have lawfully drove the vehicle away from the scene.
¶ 13 Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Oliver not only had probable cause to believe the Appellee had committed various traffic offenses, he had additional articulable information including reliable information from narcotics officers, observations of the Appellee, and inconsistent statements, that reasonably led him to believe narcotics may be found in Appellee’s vehicle. While the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its justification, in this case the officer had additional articulable facts beyond the more violations of traffic law including Appellee’s nervous demeanor and inconsistent stories of where he was going, the wrong license plates attached to his vehicle, and reliable police information that he was involved with drug trafficking that provided probable cause and justified prolonging the detention to deploy the K-9 unit. Moreover, even had Officer Oliver released the Appellee and his passengers, he would have been required to seize the vehicle given its unlawful plates and lack of insurance, and therefore would have had the authority to conduct an inventor y search on the vehicle.1
¶ 14 For the reasons above, this Court finds that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant and therefore did not violate the Appellee’s constitutional right against unlawful searches under the ICRA,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Tribal Court erred in its Order suppressing the evidence and dismissing this matter for a violation of the Appellee’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. The Tribal Court’s Order is REVERSED and REMANDED for further action consistent with this decision.
SO ORDERED the 28th day of February 2026.
FORT PECK COURT OF APPEALS
Erin Shenley, Chief Justice
B.J. Jones, Associate Justice
James Grijalva, Associate Justice
All Citations
--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 579522
Footnotes |
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Had the driver been lawfully permitted to drive the vehicle away this case may have resulted in a different decision. But, here, because the vehicle did not have proper registration, it had to remain at its location or be towed to impoundment and the subsequent dog sniff of it would have been permitted under either scenario. |
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