16 CCAR 01, 8 CTCR 27
Michael RAYTON and Stephanie PALMER, Appellants,
v.
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, et al., Appellee.
Nos. AP21-013, AP21-014
Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals
January 3, 2023
Trial Court Case No. CV-OC-2021-44075/76
Before Chief Justice Anita Dupris, Justice Dennis L. Nelson, and Justice Jane M. Smith
Dupris, CJ.
SUMMARY
Appellants Michael Rayton (Rayton) and Stephanie Palmer (Palmer) were each terminated from their respective jobs with the Colville Confederated Tribes (CCT). Rayton was terminated in August 2019 for alleged violations of the Tribes' Employee Procedures Manual (EPM). Palmer was terminated in September, 2019. Both employees were terminated under the 2018 EPM terms and procedures.
Rayton followed the EPM procedures current at the time to appeal his termination. He had his pre-hearing conference and had an Internal Review Board (IRB) hearing scheduled for October, 30, 2019.
On October 10, 2019, the Colville Business Council (CBC) amended the 2018 EPM through Resolution 2019-633. The Resolution specified that the amendments were to be effective immediately upon approval by the CBC.
On October 11, Palmer e-mailed her request for an IRB Hearing. Then on October 15, 2019, five days after the passage of Resolution 2019-633 (Resolution), she requested a hearing be changed to before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as provided in the Resolution. Her request was denied. She had a pre-hearing to the IRB on October 29, 2019. Her IRB hearing was on November 20, 2019, at which time her termination was affirmed.
Rayton had his IRB hearing on October 30, 2019, at which time he asked that his appeal be changed to before an ALJ. His request was denied. His termination was affirmed by the IRB.
Both Rayton and Palmer filed civil cases in the Trial Court on their respective denials of having hearings before an ALJ instead of the IRB. The Trial Court affirmed the denial of the ALJ hearings in both cases. This appeal followed. Both appeals were consolidated at the Initial Hearing on February 18, 2022 because of the similar issues raised by both Appellants. Based on the reasoning below, we affirm the Trial Court's decisions.
ISSUES
1. Did the Trial Court err in finding Resolution 2019-633, in which IRB review of employment issues were to be heard by an Administrative Law Judge, not applicable to Appellants' employment dismissals, especially in light of allegations of lack of procedural and substantive due process claims?
2. Did the Court err by not granting Appellants' requests that Appellants be given information regarding the Tribes' insurance policy?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both issues are issues of law. The standard of review is de novo. CCT v. Naff, 2 CCAR 50 (1995).
DISCUSSION
1. Did the Trial Court err in finding Resolution 2019-633, in which IRB review of employment issues were to be heard by an Administrative Law Judge, not applicable to Appellants' employment dismissals, especially in light of allegations of lack of procedural and substantive due process claims?
Resolution 2019-633, passed on October 10, 2019, states, in relevant part, "...to enact the attached amendments to the EPM effective immediately upon CBC approval." (Emphasis added.). The amendments changed employment termination review from the IRB to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and allows appellants to be represented by an attorney.
The Trial Court first held there was no applicable tribal law regarding retrospective versus prospective application of a law. It held that absent a legislative intent by the CBC to apply the new EPM requirement to include pending cases, it was only applicable prospectively. The Court analyzed the Resolution's language in light of Resolution 2021-321, which states the amendment to the Tribes' Civil Rights Statute, CTC, Chapter 1-5, was effective immediately, and applies to all cases, including pending cases. The Court found, by this analysis, that the CBC evinced a lack of intent to apply the Resolution retrospectively to all pending cases.
The Court held, as to statutory construction and interpretation, that ".'.. the courts have evolved a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes or amendments thereto to operate prospectively.'" (citing Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wn.2d 911, 915-16, 406 P.2d 623 (1965)).
Appellants argue, citing CTC §1-1-7(b), that the phrase "effectively immediately" should be given their plain meaning, which would be on the very date the Resolution became effective, i.e. October 10, 2019, a date prior to either of Appellants' IRB hearings.
We review this appeal on the questions of law, and when a question of fact is raised, we give deference to the Trial Court's findings under an abuse of discretion standard. Before we assess the arguments of whether the Trial Court found sufficient evidence that due process was provided to Appellants in their IRB hearings, we assess when the jurisdiction attached to their cases. This is a question not yet answered by this Court regarding administrative cases.
In both civil and criminal cases we have held that jurisdiction attaches once a petition or complaint is filed. See, Simmons v. CCT, 6 CCAR 30 (2002) (accepting Washington rule, which follows majority rule, as applying in criminal cases that jurisdiction attaches when the complaint is filed), and Carson v. Barham, 7 CCAR 17 (2003) (the "first to file" rule grants jurisdiction to the first court where the matter has been filed.)
We hold the same principle applies to administrative cases. Both Appellants filed first in the IRB. We review the Trial Court's decision only for alleged violations of due process and equal protection by the IRB that would support a ruling to reverse and remand. As stated before, our review is for abuse of discretion; we will not supplant our reasoning for the Trial Court's just because we would have decided differently had we been the judge. In order to reverse The Trial Court's findings on due process the findings must be unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. See, eg., Louie v. CCT, 7 CCAR 46 (2004); CCT v. Condon, 12 CCAR 12 (2015); Randall/LaCourse v. CFS, 11 CCAR 39 (2015).
Appellants argue the lack of due process in the IRB process, alleging the information provided them regarding their dismissal was late in coming, or not given to them at all. They did not have adequate information to prepare for their respective hearings.
In their respective Notices of Appeal both Appellants assert they were not provided due process by the Trial Court because the Judge dismissed their cases without allowing them a hearing on their motions and complaints regarding whether there were or were not irregularities in the IRB.
Appellee asserts both Appellants were provided adequate due process in their IRB hearings: they were given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Appellee cites to Wilson v. Gilliland, 8 CCAR 64 (2006) and CCT v. Bessette, 12 CCAR 29 (2015) for the applicable due process standards established by this Court in cases involving employee terminations.
The Trial Court held there was no reviewable evidence presented to determine any due process problems with the IRB hearings provided Appellants. All parties were directed by the Trial Court to present a list of evidence presented at their IRB hearings. The Court found, upon a review of Appellee's lists for both Appellants, that there was evidence that both Appellants were provided adequate due process.
As to Appellant Palmer, the Court found she failed to provide the Court with a descriptive list of any documents she did receive from Appellee, whereas Appellee provided a list of the documents it provided to Appellant Palmer. As to Appellant Rayton, the Court found that the descriptive lists of both parties showed that Appellant Rayton knew why he was terminated from his job, and had the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf regarding the reasons he was terminated. The Court held this was adequate due process.
The record supports the Trial Judge's findings of adequate due process. The Trial Judge's decisions regarding the adequate due process are not based on unreasonable or untenable reasons. We so hold.
2. Did the Court err by not granting Appellants' requests that Appellants be given information regarding the Tribes' insurance policy?
The Tribes' Civil Rights Statute, CTC Chapter 1-5, provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and if available, an insurance policy to cover the Tribes' liability for wrongful actions under CTC §§ 1-5-2 through 1-5-4.[1] Appellants base their civil complaints on this Chapter, therefore arguing they should have access to the information regarding the Tribes' insurance policy.
Appellee assert that Appellant's would only have access to the information if they have established a valid claim under CTC § 1-5-2. The Trial Court held that some of the bases of the Complaints are tort actions, and the Court is without jurisdiction over torts. We have held so in Dick/Marconi v. CCT 15 CCAR 52 (2022).
As discussed supra, the Trial Court has found no violations of Appellants' due process rights, and we have upheld this ruling. There is an insurance policy, but Appellants have not established a right to review it in that is not applicable to their cases. We so hold.
CONCLUSION
We find (1) jurisdiction over the two grievance appeals was in the IRB, and not under the new EPM section that allows for an ALJ; (2) the record supports the Trial Court's findings that each Appellant received adequate due process in their IRB hearings, and Resolution 2019-633 only applies prospectively; and (3) the record supports the Trial Judge's finding that Appellants have not met their burden to establish the applicability of CTC Chapter 1-5 to their causes of actions, and there is no right to be given information on the Tribes' liability insurance. We so hold.
Based on the foregoing, now, therefore, It is ORDERED that the Trial Court's decisions in these matters are AFFIRMED and the Appeal is DISMISSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Trial Court for actions consistent with this Opinion.
---------
Notes:
[1] 1-5-2. (h): [ The Tribes shall not] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.
1-5-3 allows for actions against the Tribes or its employees for violations of 1-5-2.
1-5-4 states the causes of action under this chapter will be in the Colville Tribal Court.
---------