1999-2000 Term
Supreme Court Cases Related to Indian Law
Two Indian law-related cases were granted.
Petition for certiorari was denied in 29 Indian law-related cases.
Cert Granted
Wise Law Library's Arizona v. California Collection - contains more than 160 full-text, searchable pleadings, briefs, orders, transcripts, and reports from the 12-year original proceeding in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Subjects: Water rights -- California
-- Colorado River (Colo.-Mexico); Water rights -- Arizona -- Colorado
River (Colo.-Mexico); Reserved water rights -- Quechan Tribe of
the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, California & Arizona;
Reserved water rights -- Colorado River Indian Tribes of the Colorado
River Indian Reservation, Arizona and California; Reserved water
rights -- Fort Mojave Indian Tribe of Arizona, California & Nevada;
United States.
*Issues: Did the United States reserve water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations?
Holding: (from Westlaw) Following
determination that United States had reserved water rights for such
reservations, 373
U.S. 546, 83
S.Ct. 1468, 10
L.Ed.2d 542, grant of tribes' motions to intervene, 460
U.S. 605, 103
S.Ct. 1382, 75
L.Ed.2d 318, and grant of States' motion to reopen decree, the
Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that: (1) claims of Quechan
Tribe for increased rights to water for disputed boundary lands
of Fort Yuma Reservation were not precluded by Supreme Court decision
finding, inter alia, that United States had reserved water rights
for reservations; (2) such claims were not precluded by consent
judgment entered in prior Court of Claims proceeding in which Tribe
had challenged 1893 Agreement providing for Tribe's cession of such
disputed lands; and (3) settlements of claim for additional water
for Fort Mojave Reservation and Colorado River Indian Reservation
would be approved.
Order accordingly.
History: Decision June 19, 2000. Case
history extends back to 1952.
*Holding below: Supreme Court held that:
1) the claims of the Quechan Tribe and of United States on tribe's
behalf for increased water rights for disputed boundary lands of
Fort Yuma Reservation were not precluded by water rights ruling
in Arizona v.
California, 373
U.S. 546; 2) nor were such claims precluded by consent judgment
entered in prior Court of Claims proceeding in which Tribe had challenged
1893 Agreement providing for Tribe's cession of such disputed lands,
and 3) settlements of claim for additional water for Fort Mojave
Reservation and Colorado River Indian Reservation would be approved.
Subjects: Native Hawaiians --
Defined; Hawaiians -- Defined; United States. Constitution. 14th
Amendment; United States. Constitution. 15th Amendment; Election
law -- Hawaii; Suffrage -- Hawaii; Race discrimination -- Hawaii.
*Issues: Did court of appeals err in holding
that 14th and 15th Amendments permit adoption of explicit racial
classification that restricts right to vote in statewide elections
for state officials?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy, held that:
(1) limiting voters to those persons
whose ancestry qualified them as either a “Hawaiian”
or “native Hawaiian,” as defined by statute, violated
Fifteenth Amendment by using ancestry as proxy for race, and thereby
enacting a race-based voting qualification;
(2) exclusion of non-Hawaiians
from voting for OHA trustees was not permissible under cases allowing
differential treatment of certain members of Indian tribes;
(3)
voting qualification was not permissible under cases holding that
one-person, one-vote rule did not pertain to certain special purpose
districts; and
(4) voting qualification was not saved from unconstitutionality
on theory that voting restriction merely ensured an alignment of
interests between fiduciaries and beneficiaries of a trust.
Reversed.
History: Petition for certiorari filed
November 17, 1998. Petition for review granted March 22, 1999. Interim
order September 10, 1999. Oral Argument heard October 6, 1999. Decision
February 23, 2000.
*Holding below: Rice
v. Cayetano, 146
F.3d 1075, 9th Cir. Neither equal protection clause nor 15th
Amendment bars restricting participation in elections for trustees
of Office of Hawaiian Affairs--who administer public trust funds
set aside for betterment of ''native Hawaiians'' and ''Hawaiians,''
i.e., descendants of aboriginal people who inhabited Hawaii in 1778
and thereafter--to only those voters who meet blood quantum requirement
for native Hawaiian or Hawaiian, who constitute only group with
stake in trust and funds administered by OHA trustees, who have
no general governmental powers and perform no general governmental
functions.
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Cert Denied
Court of Indian Offenses of the Choctaw Nation v. Dry
Docket No. 98-1879
Subjects: United States. Indian
Civil Rights Act; Detention of persons -- Defined; In custody --
Defined; Habeas corpus; Jurisdiction.
*Issues: (1) For purposes of habeas corpus
review, is ''detention,'' as used in Indian Civil Rights Act, synonymous
with phrase ''in custody,'' as employed in 28
U.S.C. § 2241? (2) If not, are individuals who have been
released on their own recognizance by tribal court pending trial
for violations of tribal law, and whose movements are in no way
restricted, under ''detention'' within meaning of 25
U.S.C. § 1303, absent any special circumstances? (3) If
''detention'' and ''in custody'' are synonymous, are such persons
''in custody'' for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under
this court's case law? (4) If so, should Justices
of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon and its progeny be overruled
insofar as those cases hold that they are? (5) In case of first
habeas corpus petition, should abuse of writ be found when, as here,
theory upon which petition relies has already been rejected in numerous
decisions of state, federal, and tribal courts following years of
protracted pretrial litigation by petitioners?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
May 21, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 4, 1999.
*Holding below: Dry
v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation, 168
F.3d 1207, 10th Cir. Under Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., which makes habeas corpus ''available
to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality
of his detention by order of an Indian tribe,'' ''detention'' under
Section 1303 is analogous to ''custody'' within meaning of federal
habeas statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2241; petitioners who were charged, arraigned,
and released on own recognizance pending trial in tribal court meet
''in custody'' requirement of Section 2241 under rationale of Justices
of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466
U.S. 294 (1984), and, therefore, district court erred in dismissing
their habeas petition regardless of whether its jurisdiction was
based on Section 1303 or Section 2241.
Johnson v. Gila River Indian Community
Docket No. 99-162
Subjects: United States. Indian
Civil Rights Act; Sovereign immunity -- Gila River Indian Community
of the Gila River Indian Reservation, Arizona; Jurisdiction --
Gila River Indian Community of the Gila River Indian Reservation,
Arizona;
Judicial power -- Gila River Indian Community of the Gila River Indian Reservation,
Arizona; Land tenure.
*Issues: (1) Did district court improperly
dismiss petitioner's claims against Gila River Indian Community
for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 1331? (2) Did petitioner's allegation of unlawful
exercise of tribal court judicial power require district court to
conduct evidentiary hearing to determine under Section 1331 whether
tribal court exceeded lawful limits of its jurisdiction?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
July 21, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 4, 1999.
*Holding below: Johnson
v. Gila River Indian Community, 174
F.3d 1032, 9th Cir. Indian tribes possess common law immunity
from suit in federal court, and thus district court properly dismissed
individual's Indian Civil Rights Act claims against tribe alleging
that tribe had unconstitutionally converted his property by its
appellate court's unreasonable delay in ruling on his appeal from
judgment against him by tribal court that lacked personal jurisdiction
over him.
Lee v. Hawaii
Docket No. 98-1982
Subjects: Due process of law
-- Hawaii; Hawaii. Constitution (1950); United States. Constitution.
14th Amendment; Native Hawaiians; Traffic regulations -- Hawaii;
Insurance, No-fault automobile -- Hawaii.
*Issues: (1) By abolishing tort liability,
does Hawaii no-fault law deny due process in violation of 14th Amendment
by depriving defendant and native Hawaiians of right of redress,
guaranteed by 1840 Kingdom of Hawaii Constitution, and right of
recovery for tort injuries, established by subsequent legislation
and judicial decisions? (2) Given state statutes requiring citation
of both driver and registered owner upon same traffic ticket for
no-fault insurance violations, was defendant denied due process
by affirmance of his conviction after trial at which traffic citation
was not introduced into evidence, defendant was not identified as
driver only or registered owner, and defendant was not identified
as recipient of no-fault citation?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
June 7, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 4, 1999.
*Holding below: State
v. Lee, 976
P.2d 444, 3rd Cir. Police officer's testimony that defendant
failed to produce insurance card and admitted that he did not have
card was sufficient to establish that defendant and vehicle he was
driving were uninsured, in violation of state statute, Haw. Rev.
State. § 431:10C-104, making it crime to operate vehicle without
no-fault insurance; statute does not require prosecution to prove
that defendant was owner of vehicle or to identify registered owner;
even if trial court were required to cause appearance of registered
owner of vehicle as well as driver, failure to do so would not provide
basis for reversing driver's conviction; 1840 Constitution of Kingdom
of Hawaii, upon which defendant relies for his argument that no-fault
law is invalid, no longer remains in force.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United
States
Docket No. 98-1692
Subjects: Due process of law -- Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Florida; Equality before the law -- Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Florida; Trusts and trustees -- United States; Discovery (Law);
Breach of trust -- United States.
*Issues: (1) Were Indian tribe and its
chairman entitled to discovery prior to summary judgment when their
complaint alleged violations of constitutional rights and violations
of Indian trust doctrine and when allegations did not involve individual
capacity claims for damages against officials? (2) Was affirmance
by Eleventh Circuit of summary judgment by district court, prior
to discovery, improper under Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 66 U.S.L.W. 4311 (1998), and other precedent? (3)
Even if Crawford-El v. Britton created new pleading standard for
constitutional claims not involving individual capacity suits for
damages, was Eleventh Circuit required to remand case to trial court
to afford petitioners opportunity to amend their complaint since
Crawford-El was decided after case at bar was on appeal?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
April 21, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 4, 1999.
*Holding below: Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 163
F.3d 1359, 11th Cir. Absent (i) genuine issue of material fact
as to Native American tribe's due process and equal protection claims
against state and federal defendants, and (ii) demonstration of
how further discovery would enable tribe to rebut showing of such
absence of genuine issue of material fact, and in absence of federal
defendants' violation of their trust duties to tribe, district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying tribe's Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(f)
motion to postpone consideration of defendants' summary judgment
motions and in staying discovery pending disposition of those motions.
New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept. v. Ramah
Navajo School Bd.
Docket No. 99-59
Subjects: Motor fuels -- Taxation --
New Mexico; Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Gasoline
-- Storage -- On Indian reservations -- Navajo Nation, Arizona,
New Mexico & Utah; Ramah Navajo School Board;
Distributors (Commerce) -- New Mexico; United States. Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act.
*Issues: Is state gasoline tax imposed
on purchase of gasoline by non-Indian gasoline dealer from non-Indian
refinery off reservation preempted by 1975 Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450 et seq., simply because gasoline is subsequently
resold to tribal entity on reservation with cost of tax passed on
as one of gasoline dealer's imbedded costs?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
July 6, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 12, 1999.
*Holding below: Ramah
Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept., 977
P.2d 1021, 10th Cir. Provisions of 1975 Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, whose purpose is to encourage Indian
entities to assume education-related duties that would otherwise
be performed by federal agencies and which mandates that Indian
entity should receive as much federal funding for performing such
services as federal agency would receive, preempt state gasoline
taxes to extent that gasoline was sold to tribal school board that
operates programs under 1975 statute for its exclusive use, because
taxes, assessed against non-Indian distributors and passed along
to board as part of cost, undermine act to extent that tribal board
must bear economic burden of taxes that, under state law, would
not have been imposed if gasoline had been for exclusive use of
agency or instrumentality of United States.
New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept. v. Ramah
Navajo School Bd.
Docket No. 99-228
Subjects: Motor fuels -- Taxation --
New Mexico; Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Gasoline
-- Storage -- On Indian reservations -- Navajo Nation, Arizona,
New Mexico & Utah; Ramah Navajo School Board;
Distributors (Commerce) -- New Mexico; United States. Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act.
*Issues: Does Indian tribal governmental
entity present cognizable claim under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 when its rights under 1975
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA),
25
U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, have been violated by state excise
tax that deprive it of significant, measurable, and predictable
financial resources appropriated by Congress for express purpose
of improving tribal education, health and environment?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
August 5, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 12, 1999.
*Holding below: Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.
v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept., 977
P.2d 1021, 10th Cir. Although state entities and officials may
be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief, U.S.
Supreme Court held in National
Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 515
U.S. 582 (1995), that § 1983 action for injunctive or declaratory
relief (and accompanying claim for attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988) will not lie with respect to imposition
of state tax if state provides adequate remedy at law; accordingly,
because district court did not err in ruling that N.M. Tax Administration
Act provides adequate remedy for Native American school board to
challenge disputed taxes, district court's dismissal of § 1983
claims in connection with such taxes is affirmed. Native American
school board, as assignee of gasoline distributors, sought refund
of state gasoline taxes assessed against the distributors before
gasoline was delivered to Ramah Navajo reservation. The Taxation
and Revenue Dept. denied the refund request and the board sought
judicial review. The district court granted summary judgment for
the Department and the board appealed. The court of appeals held
that: (1) Board could not bring claims for injunctive or declaratory
relief under § 1983; (2) there was no preemption of the gasoline
taxes by implication under ISDEAA; but (3) under general preemption
doctrine, the gasoline taxes were preempted to the extent that they
made it more costly for the Native American school board to perform
services than it would be for federal agencies to perform the same
services.
New York v. Seneca Nation of Indians
Docket No. 99-269
Subjects: Seneca Nation of New York;
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians of New York; New York (State);
New York State Thruway Authority; Conveyancing; Grand Island (N.Y.
: Island); Niagara River (N.Y. and Ont.); Treaties -- Ratification;
United States. Trade and Intercourse Act; Land tenure; Interest
(Ownership rights); Indian title -- New York (State); Treaty of
Canandaigua (1794); United States. Constitution. 11th Amendment.
*Issues: Is continued involvement of Seneca
Nation of Indians and Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians in these
federal land claim actions against New York barred by 11th Amendment
because, notwithstanding intervention of United States years after
actions were commenced, actions are not at instance and under control
of responsible federal officers and thus New York has never consented
to them?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
August 16, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied January 10, 2000.
*Holding below: Seneca
Nation of Indians v. New York, 178
F.3d 95, 2nd Cir. Indian tribes' claims in their action against
New York that are identical to those raised by United States as
intervenor are not barred by 11th Amendment.
Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project
Docket No. 99-182
Subjects: Modoc Indian Health Project;
Indian business enterprises -- Alturas Indian Rancheria, California;
Indian business enterprises -- Cedarville Rancheria, California;
Jurisdiction -- Tribes; Indian business enterprises -- Off Indian
reservations; Constitutional law -- Tribes; United States. Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title 7; Discrimination in employment; Tribes
-- Defined.
*Issues: (1) Does provision in tribal
constitution that expressly limits tribe's jurisdiction to within
boundaries of tribe's reservation preclude tribe from creating corporation
that would enjoy status of tribe, if corporate offices of such corporation
are located, and activities are conducted, outside boundaries of
reservation and outside of Indian country? (2) Is tribal corporation,
located off reservation and created by consortium of tribes whose
constitutions expressly limit their jurisdiction to within confines
of their respective reservations, considered tribe for purpose of
exemption from Title VII? (3) Is tribal corporation, located off
reservation and created by consortium of tribes whose constitutions
expressly limit their jurisdiction to within confines of their respective
reservations, immune from suit in federal court, when no tribal
court exists?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
May 18, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 4, 1999.
*Holding below: Pink
v. Modoc Indian Health Project, 157
F.3d 1185, 9th Cir. Nonprofit corporation incorporated by two
Indian tribes that provides health services to tribal members under
federal Indian self-determination contract with Department of Health
and Human Services is ''tribe'' within meaning of Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act's exemption of tribes from definition of ''employer,''
thus precluding former employee's suit against corporation alleging
Title VII violations.
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States
Docket No. 99-34
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Yankton
Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Attachment and garnishment; United
States. Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act; Persons -- Defined.
*Issues: Can Indian tribe's sovereign
immunity be waived absent clear and unequivocal congressional statement
of waiver?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
June 30, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied October 12, 1999.
*Holding below: United
States v. Weddell, 187
F.3d 645, 8th Cir. Court affirms district court's ruling that
Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, which defines ''person''
who may be sued as garnishee to include ''an Indian tribe,'' 28
U.S.C. § 3002(10), clearly and unequivocally expressed
waiver of Indian tribes' sovereign immunity, and thus subjected
tribe, as garnishee, to garnishment suit against one of its members.
Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Cuomo
Docket No. 99-1486
Subjects: Sac & Fox Nation, Oklahoma; United States. Dept. of Housing
and Urban Development; Federal question; Jurisdiction -- United
States; Federal aid to housing; Housing authorities -- Tribes --
United States.
*Issues: (1) Under due process standards
and standard requiring short and plain statement of grounds upon
which court's jurisdiction depends, did petitioners receive fair
hearing on complaint alleging that federal officials named as defendants
were misallocating federally appropriated funds to detriment of
plaintiff Indian tribes invoking federal question jurisdiction under
28
U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362 but not citing specific federal
law? (2) Under ''appearance of bias'' standard of 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) and due process required by Fifth Amendment,
were petitioners denied their right to fair and impartial magistrate
when presiding judge: (a) had, prior to becoming federal judge,
previously appeared as attorney of record for one or more of defendants
in prior litigation involving plaintiff and same or similar issues,
(b) did not document in record actual extent of involvement in prior
litigation when denying motion to recuse, and (c) managed litigation
in fashion from which one could reasonably infer that plaintiffs
were being effectively denied relief without ever being allowed
their day in court?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
March 8, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied June 12, 2000.
*Holding below: Sac
& Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Cuomo, 193
F.3d 1162, 10th Cir. Indian tribes' allegation that another
tribe's housing authority was encroaching upon their operational/jurisdictional
areas as defined by state law did not raise federal question, Department
of Housing and Urban Development regulation cited by tribes' counsel
in footnote of reply brief on appeal was insufficient to constitute
amendment of their complaint, and thus district court properly dismissed
complaint for failure to establish federal question jurisdiction;
district judge's prior service as U.S. attorney was not grounds
for disqualification absent showing that she personally participated
in particular case involving Bureau of Indian Affairs, nothing in
judge's rulings in this case provides reasonable basis from which
to infer partiality, and thus district judge properly denied tribes'
motion to disqualify her.
Buchanan v. Washington
Docket No. 99-783
Subjects: Hunting rights -- Nooksack
Indian Tribe of Washington -- Members; Treaty rights -- Nooksack
Indian Tribe of Washington -- Members; Treaties -- Interpretation
and construction -- Washington (State).
*Issues: Does Washington Supreme Court's
restrictive interpretation of Indian hunting rights under Stevens
Treaties ignore plain language of those treaties and conflict with
settled principles of treaty construction in federal courts?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
November 1, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied February 22, 2000.
*Holding below: State
v. Buchanan, 978
P.2d 1070, 9th Cir. Geographic scope of hunting rights preserved
by treaty to tribe to which defendant belongs extends only to lands
ceded by tribe to United States and lands upon which tribe traditionally
hunted; dismissal of charges against defendant, on ground that treaty
allowed him to hunt anywhere in ''Territory of Washington,'' is
reversed.
Washington v. Buchanan
Docket No. 99-964
Subjects: Equal footing doctrine; Hunting rights
-- Off Indian reservations -- State supervision -- Washington (State); Hunting
rights -- Nooksack Indian Tribe of Washington -- Members; Treaty rights --
Nooksack Indian Tribe of Washington -- Members; Treaties -- Interpretation
and construction -- Washington (State).
*Issues: (1) Does equal footing terminate
temporary hunting rights at statehood? (2) Did court below ignore
ordinary, contemporary, and legal meaning of language ''open and
unclaimed'' contained in applicable treaties? (3) Is opinion of
court below inconsistent with Minnesota
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172, 67 U.S.L.W. 4189 (1999), by restricting Washington's
power to regulate off-reservation hunting by members of treaty tribes
only after proof of closure of all citizen hunting and proof that
species of wildlife is in danger of extinction?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
December 6, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied February 22, 2000.
*Holding below: Washington
v. Buchanan, 978
P.2d 1070, 9th Cir. Wildlife area where defendant Native American
tribe member killed elk out of season was ''open and unclaimed land''
within meaning of treaty that provided hunting rights to tribe;
Native Americans' right under treaty to hunt on such land may be
regulated by state only as conservation measure; under prior decisions,
admission of Washington into union ''on equal footing'' with original
states did not abrogate treaty hunting rights.
Mannatt v. United States
Docket No. 99-892
Subjects: Fort Independence Indian Community
of Paiute Indians of the Fort Independence Reservation, California
-- Boundaries; Boundary disputes -- Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians of the Fort
Independence Reservation, California; Trust lands -- Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians of the Fort
Independence Reservation, California; United States. Bureau of Land Management; Jurisdiction -- United States.
*Issues: (1) May members of Indian tribe
unilaterally alter historic boundary line by removing existing fence
and erecting new fence on land that was formerly private property?
(2) May federal government change boundary line of executive order
Indian reservation by resurveying Indian trust land without congressional
approval? (3) May private properties affected by resurvey of Indian
trust land challenge validity of resurvey in U.S. district court?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
November 24, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied January 25, 2000.
*Holding below: Mannatt
v. United States, 185
F.3d 868, 9th Cir. Complaint alleging that Bureau of Land Management
had unlawfully relocated boundary of Indian reservation to detriment
of owner of property adjacent to reservation was properly dismissed
by district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
dispute involving Indian trust land.
Campbell v. Sletten
Docket No. 99-1320
Subjects: Trespass -- Prairie Island
Indian Community in the State of Minnesota; Qualified immunity;
Conveyances -- Prairie Island Indian Community in the State of
Minnesota; Breach of contract -- Prairie Island Indian Community
in the State of Minnesota; Prairie Island Indian Community in the
State of Minnesota -- Members; Participation -- United States.
*Issues: (1) Does deputy sheriff or city
police officer have requisite authority to deprive enrolled member
of Indian community of his federally protected land assignment without
participation of United States in form of federal action by means
of federal writ, and does taking of Indian's federally protected
land assignment by local peace officers acting under color of state
law violate federal civil rights legislation? (2) Does ''reasonable
belief of reasonable suspicion'' standard proposed by district court
in this case have any legal basis, and does such standard meet requisite
objective standard of probable cause? (3) Did district court improperly
adjudicate disputed issues of material fact in granting qualified
immunity to defendant officer?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
February 2, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied April 17, 2000.
*Holding below: Campbell
v. Sletten, 198
F.3d 249, 8th Cir. Local police officers had probable cause
to arrest for criminal trespass enrolled member of Indian community
who refused to vacate land assignment that was subject of agreement
with Indian community whereby arrestee contracted to convey his
land assignment back to community in exchange for another land assignment;
officers are entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's civil
rights action.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, et
al, v. Tamiami Partners Ltd.
Docket No. 99-1013
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- United States;
Contracts; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Jurisdiction
-- Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida; Sovereign immunity --
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida; Indian Gaming -- Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida.
*Issues: (1) Do federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over contract dispute between management contractor
and Miccosukee Tribe? (2) Does Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provide
management contractors with private cause of action against Indian
tribes? (3) Did Eleventh Circuit err in implying waiver of tribe's
sovereign immunity under IGRA?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
December 14, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied March 20, 2000.
*Holding below: Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. ex rel. Tamiami Development Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Fla., 177
F.3d 1212, 11th Cir. Claim that tribe, in order to take over
bingo operation, had in bad faith denied gaming license applications
of firm hired by tribe to build and manage tribe's bingo hall arose
under federal law by virtue of incorporation into parties' management
agreement of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and its licensing regulations,
and thus district court had subject matter jurisdiction over firm's
complaint seeking arbitration of its claim; tribe's sovereign immunity
was waived by management agreement insofar as firm's complaint seeks
(i) declaration that, in accordance with agreement, disputes between
firm and tribe that arise out of or relate to agreement are arbitrable,
(ii) judgment requiring tribe to comply with prior arbitration award,
and (iii) judgment compelling tribe to arbitrate certain disputes
relating to agreement.
Roberts v. United States
Docket No. 99-1174
Subjects: Trust lands -- Choctaw Nation
of Oklahoma; Indian Country (U.S.) -- Defined; Jurisdiction --
United States. United States. Dept. of the Interior -- Powers and
duties.
*Issues: (1) Does standardless delegation
by Congress of totally ''discretion[ary]'' authority to executive
official to acquire land ''for Indians'' amount to unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, as Eighth Circuit has held and
Tenth Circuit declined to hold below? (2) If not, is executive official's
acquisition of off-reservation property pursuant to this authority
enough, standing alone, to transform property into ''Indian country''
as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1151?
History: Petition for certiorari denied
May 15, 2000.
*Holding below: United
States v. Roberts, 185
F.3d 1125, 10th Cir. Land owned by United States in trust for
Choctaw Nation is ''Indian country,'' particularly in light of district
court's findings that property where nation's headquarters is situated
was validly set aside for tribe under superintendence of federal
government; 25
U.S.C. § 465, which authorizes secretary of interior ''in
his discretion, to acquire . . . any interest in lands, . . . within
or without existing reservations, including trust . . . , for the
purpose of providing land for Indians,'' is proper delegation to
secretary of interior of authority to acquire land for Indian tribes;
federal courts have jurisdiction over defendant's acts that occurred
in Indian country, and his convictions are affirmed.
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney
Docket No. 99-1610
Subjects: Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas;
Sovereign immunity -- Texas -- Officials and employees; United States. Constitution.
11th Amendment; United States. Constitution. 14th Amendment; Real property -- Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas; Conveyances; Land tenure -- Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas.
*Issues: (1) Does 11th Amendment bar suits
against state officials under Ex
parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 1908), to recover possession of property? (2) Does
decision of Fifth Circuit that Indian tribes cannot recover possession
of real property under Ex parte Young violate federal government's
trust responsibility to tribes? (3) Does 1834 Indian Non-Intercourse
Act abrogate states' 11th Amendment immunity to suits by Indian
tribes to recover possession of tribal lands?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
April 5, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied May 22, 2000.
*Holding below: Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199
F.3d 281, 5th Cir. Indian tribe's federal court suit against
state and state officials alleging that tribal property was conveyed
to state in violation of Indian Nonintercourse Act is barred by
11th Amendment.
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
Docket No. 99-1608
Subjects: Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas;
Sovereign immunity -- Texas -- Officials and employees; United States. Constitution.
11th Amendment; United States. Constitution. 14th Amendment.
*Issues: Did states, by adopting 14th
Amendment, waive their 11th Amendment immunity by consenting under
"plan of Convention" to suits based on takings clause
of Fifth Amendment?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
April 5, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied May 15, 2000.
*Holding below: Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 207
F.3d 658, 5th Cir. Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not
abrogate states' 11th Amendment immunity by virtue of incorporation
into 14th Amendment.
Yakama Indian Nation v. Washington Dep't of Revenue
Docket No. 99-636
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Washington; Cigarette sellers -- Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Washington; Searches and seizures -- Washington (State); Cigarettes -- Taxation -- Washington (State); Cigarettes -- Transportation -- Washington (State); Commerce -- Law and legislation -- Washington (State).
*Issues: Under College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 527
U.S. 666, 67 U.S.L.W. 4590 (1999), may state abrogate Indian
tribe's sovereign immunity by seizing tribe's property and conditioning
its return on tribe's willingness to waive its sovereign immunity
and submit to state forfeiture proceedings?
History: Petition for certiorari filed October 12, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied January 18, 2000.
*Holding below: Yakama
Indian Nation v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 176
F.3d 1241, 9th Cir. Eleventh Amendment bars Indian tribe's lawsuit
against state for declaratory and injunctive relief and for proceeds
from state's sale of cigarettes that state had seized as contraband
for tribe's failure to give state required notification of transport
to tribe of cigarette packages that did not bear state tax stamps.
Osage Tribal Council v. Department of Labor
Docket No. 99-1482
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Osage
Tribe, Oklahoma; United States. Safe Drinking Water Act; Drinking
water -- Inspection -- On Indian reservations -- Osage
Tribe, Oklahoma; United States. Dept. of Labor; Jurisdiction
-- United States; Whistle blowing.
*Issues: Did Tenth Circuit err in holding that Indian tribe's
sovereign immunity was unmistakably waived by Congress in definition provisions of SDWA,
when statute also provides: ''For the purposes of this chapter the term 'Federal Agency'
shall not be construed to refer to or include any American Indian Tribe, nor the Secretary
of the Interior in his capacity as trustee of Indian lands''?
History: Petition for certiorari filed March 6, 2000.
Petition for certiorari denied June 12, 2000.
*Holding below: Osage
Tribal Council v. Department of Labor, 187
F.3d 1174, 10th Cir. Whistleblower provision of Safe Drinking
Water Act expressly abrogates tribal sovereign immunity by granting
Department of Labor jurisdiction over all ''persons,'' defining
''persons'' to include ''municipality,'' and defining ''municipality''
to include ''Indian Tribe,'' thus subjecting tribe to enforcement
provisions of SDWA for allegedly discharging environmental inspector
in violation of SDWA whistleblower rights.
Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians
Docket No. 99-1498
Subjects: Exhaustion of tribal remedies;
Sovereign immunity -- Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians;
Jurisdiction -- United States; Jurisdiction -- Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians; Torts.
*Issues: (1) Is exhaustion of tribal remedies required when
tribe has unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity from liability for torts committed
against plaintiff? (2) Can exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine abolish federal court's
jurisdiction to review tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction over federal claim, when
tribal appellate court refused review because plaintiff had missed deadline?
History: Petition for certiorari filed March 3, 2000.
Petition for certiorari denied May 1, 2000.
*Holding below: Davis
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 193
F.3d 990, 8th Cir. Tribal member's failure to file timely notice
of appeal from tribal court's decision dismissing her claims against
tribe and its attorney precludes federal district court jurisdiction
over her claims for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies; tribe's
purported waiver of sovereign immunity does not do away with exhaustion
requirement.
Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety Department v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior
Docket No. 99-1239
Subjects: United States. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act; Public contracts -- United States; Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota -- Finance; Overhead costs -- Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota.
*Issues: Did Congress, by ''notwithstanding''
clause in 25
U.S.C. 450j-1(b), avoid and in effect eliminate its contractual
obligation arising from 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., thereby vitiating
entire Indian Self-Determination Act?
History: Petition for certiorari filed January 24, 2000.
Petition for certiorari denied May 20, 2000.
*Holding below: Babbitt
v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety Dept., 194
F.3d 1374, Federal Cir. Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act explicitly makes funding of indirect (contract support)
costs of ''self-determination'' contracts subject to availability
of appropriations, and thus Department of Interior, acting in accordance
with 1995 fiscal year appropriations, properly paid tribal contractor
only 91.74 percent of what was otherwise owed for contract support
costs under 1995 fiscal year contract.
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. United States
Docket No. 99-1755
Subjects: Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota; Excise tax -- United States; Tax refunds -- Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Persons -- Defined -- United
States; Tribes -- Defined -- United States; Taxation -- Law and
legislation -- United States.
*Issues: Is Indian tribal government person
subject to penalty by 26
U.S.C. 6675?
History: Petition for certiorari denied June 12, 2000.
*Holding below: Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe v. United States, 197
F.3d 949, 8th Cir. Native American tribe is "person" under 26
U.S.C. 6675 subject to penalty for filing excessive federal
tax refund claim.
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
Docket No. 99-958
Subjects: Gambling -- Law and legislation
-- Texas; Indian gaming -- Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas; Gambling
on Indian reservations -- Texas; United States. Constitution. 11th
Amendment; Judgments, Declaratory.
*Issues: Does 11th Amendment bar pueblo's
action against Texas for declaration that federal law permits its
gaming activities when ''nothing is demanded from the state [and
no] claim against it of any description is asserted or prosecuted,''
see Cohens v. Virginia,
19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 410 (1821)?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
December 6, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied February 22, 2000.
*Holding below: Ysleta
del sur Pueblo v. Texas, 79
F.Supp.2d 708, 5th Cir. Indian tribe failed to establish standing
and ripeness requirements necessary to invoke court of appeals'
jurisdiction under Article III, and thus district court's dismissal,
on 11th Amendment immunity grounds, of tribe's suit against state
seeking declaration that tribe's gaming activities at its casino
are in compliance with Texas law is affirmed on alternate ground.
Estate of Red Wolf v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company
Docket No. 98-1521
Subjects: Civil jurisdiction -- Crow Tribe of Montana; Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad; Railroad accidents -- On Indian reservations -- Crow Tribe of Montana; Liability for railroad accidents; Jurisdiction -- Crow Tribe of Montana; Jurisdiction -- United States; Wrongful death; Exhaustion of tribal
remedies -- Crow Tribe of Montana.
*Issues: (1) Does main rule in Montana
v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), apply to reservation accident involving tribal
members and occurring at intersection of railroad right-of-way and
tribal road under jurisdiction, dominion, and control of tribe?
(2) Do tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over wrongful death
action brought by tribal members arising out of railroad's breach
of its congressionally mandated obligation to operate its railroad
''with due regard for the rights of the Indians''? (3) When there
exist disputed issues of fact concerning applicability of Montana's
main rule or Montana exceptions, is exhaustion of tribal court remedies
pursuant to National
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471
U.S. 845 (1985), still required? (4) Is tribal consent to state
court jurisdiction pursuant to 25
U.S.C. § 1326 mandatory before tribal plaintiff, excluded
from tribal court, may pursue alternative forum in either state
or federal court?
History: Petition for certiorari denied
May 15, 2000.
*Holding below: Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf, 196
F.3d 1059, 9th Cir. Tribal court lacks jurisdiction over tribal
members' tort claim against railroad arising from accident on right-of-way
through reservation land granted to railroad by Congress.
Yakama Indian Nation v. Washington Dep't of Revenue
Docket No. 99-1636
Subjects: Indian allotments -- Alaska
-- Fairbanks; Alaska Natives; Due process of law -- United States;
United States. Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act;
Limitation of actions; United States. Constitution. 5th Amendment.
*Issues: (1) Does Fifth Amendment's guarantee
of due process require government to have provided petitioner with
sufficient notice, reasonable time to comply, and oral hearing before
government denied his Alaska Native Allotment, or may government
instead eliminate requirement of oral hearing by promulgating regulation?
(2) Was petitioner's Alaska Native Allotment application "pending
before the Department of Interior on or before December 18, 1971"
within meaning of Section 905(a) of 1980 Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1634(a), so that his allotment either is legislatively
approved or must be adjudicated?
History: Petition for certiorari filed April 10, 2000.
Petition for certiorari denied June 5, 2000.
*Holding below: Lord
v. Babbitt, 188
F.3d 513, 9th Cir. Statute of limitations bars complaint seeking
to establish right to Alaska Native Allotment in vicinity of Fairbanks,
Alaska, filed in 1994 by individual who received notice of termination,
for failure to submit proof of use and occupancy, of his 1957 application
for allotment in 1963 by registered mail, receipt for which was
signed by his wife; complainant's contention that limitations period
should be equitably tolled is barred for reasons expressed by district
court, which held that complainant's failure to contest or appeal
termination decision, which clearly stated that his application
had been terminated, set forth grounds on which it was based, and
afforded complainant opportunity to appeal, after receiving actual
notice thereof by virtue of notice's delivery to his wife precludes
equitable tolling of limitations period.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District
v. Dawavendewa
Docket No. 99-1628
Subjects: Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District; Indian preference in hiring -- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah -- Members; Hopi
Indians; Independent contractors -- On Indian reservations -- Navajo
Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Sovereign immunity -- Tribes -- United States; Tribal self-determination -- United States; United States. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act; United States. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title 7; Discrimination in employment.
*Issues: (1) Does Ninth Circuit's interpretation
frustrate Congress's intent of promoting tribal sovereignty and
self-governance, particularly in light of Congress's recent explicit
endorsement of tribal-based preferences in context of Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act? (2) Do principles that this court
announced in Morton
v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974), require conclusion that preferences given to
Indians based on their tribal affiliation are political (and not
based on race or national origin) and are therefore beyond scope
of Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act altogether?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
April 9, 1999. Petition for certiorari denied January 10, 2000.
*Holding below: Dawavendewa
v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District,
154
F.3d 1117, 9th Cir. Provision of Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights
Act that permits employers to favor Indians over non-Indians, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i), does not authorize discrimination
based on tribal affiliation.
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe
Docket No. 99-1490
Subjects: Indian allotments -- Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota; United States. General Allotment Act (1887);
Indian Country (U.S.) -- Defined; Diminished Indian reservations -- Yankton
Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Conveyancing; Disestablished Indian reservations
-- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Boundaries -- Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota -- Defined.
*Issues: Did 1894 statute ratifying agreement
between Yankton Sioux Tribe and United States disestablish Yankton
Sioux reservation (as South Dakota Supreme Court held) or does reservation
still exist, consisting of more than 1,000 acres of ceded lands,
contrary to precise holding of this court in South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 66 U.S.L.W. 4092 (1998), plus potentially thousands
of other scattered and noncontiguous acres (as Eighth Circuit held)?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
March 7, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied June 26, 2000.
*Holding below: Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188
F.3d 1010, 8th Cir. District court judgments are affirmed to
extent that court found that Yankton Sioux Reservation has not been
disestablished, but reversed to extent that court found 1858 exterior
reservation boundaries remain intact and that all nonceded lands
remain part of reservation; text of 1894 statute that ratified 1892
agreement between Yankton Sioux Tribe and United States in which
federal government allotted to individual tribal members lands previously
held in common by tribe and then purchased remaining unallotted
lands to open them up for homesteading, and evidence concerning
parties' contemporaneous understanding of statute, establish that
reservation designated for Yankton Sioux in 1858 was maintained,
but do not define its precise boundaries, although historical context
makes clear that parties did not intend for tribe to retain control
over allotted lands that passed out of trust status and into hands
of non-Indians; record's lack of clear information about current
amount of Indian trust land on reservation precludes court from
defining precise limits of reservation that remains.
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey
Docket No. 99-1683
Subjects: Indian allotments -- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; United States. General Allotment Act (1887); Indian Country
(U.S.) -- Defined; Diminished Indian reservations -- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Conveyancing;
Disestablished Indian reservations -- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Boundaries -- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota
-- Defined.
*Issues: (1) Do allotments made under
General Allotment Act cease to be "Indian Country" if
they are conveyed to non-Indians? (2) Was Yankton Sioux Reservation
diminished by conveyance of individual Indian allotments to non-Indians
in fee simple?
History: Petition for certiorari filed
March 6, 2000. Petition for certiorari denied June 26, 2000.
*Holding below: Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188
F.3d 1010, 8th Cir. District court judgments are affirmed
to extent that court found that Yankton Sioux Reservation
has not been disestablished, but reversed to extent that
court found that 1858 exterior reservation boundaries remain
intact and that all nonceded lands remain part of reservation;
text of 1894 statute that ratified 1892 agreement between
Yankton Sioux Tribe and United States in which federal government
allotted to individual tribal members lands previously held
in common by tribe and then purchased remaining unallotted
lands to open them up for homesteading, and evidence concerning
parties' contemporaneous understanding of statute, establish
that reservation designated for Yankton Sioux in 1858 was
maintained, but do not define its precise boundaries, although
historical context makes clear that parties did not intend
for tribe to retain control over allotted lands that passed
out of trust status and into hands of non-Indians; record's
lack of clear information about current amount of Indian trust
land on reservation precludes court from defining precise
limits of reservation that remains.
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